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A Proposal for Taxing Cryptocurrency 
In the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic
by Richard T. Ainsworth and Xiuyuan (Tony) Hu
The COVID-19 pandemic cannot last forever.
When it is behind us, the world will probably 
ask China to pay for huge economic and 
humanitarian losses based on the belief that the 
spread of disinformation pertaining to COVID-19 
caused the world to underestimate its severity.1 If 
China does not pay (and it likely will not), the 
international community should look for a global 
revenue source to help fund the response to health 
emergencies. A globally effective remedial tax on 
cryptocurrency could help fund much-needed 
humanitarian assistance to jurisdictions 
debilitated by COVID-19 — and it could help the 
world prepare for the inevitable pandemics that 
seem all too likely to occur in the future.2
It is no secret that criminals have been dealing 
drugs3 and conducting other illicit business on the 
dark web for years.4 These transactions and the 
income they produce are notoriously untaxed 
largely because cryptocurrency is the preferred 
medium of exchange. Much like cash transactions, 
the use of cryptocurrencies on the dark web can 
leave no trace of the transacting parties’ 
identities.5 Occasionally law enforcement can 
track down illicit activities, including by using 
undercover agents to pose as potential buyers on 
the dark web or following credible leads from 
informants,6 but they lack a systematic means to 
pierce through criminals’ anonymity. This leaves 
the vast majority of wrongdoers uncaught, their 
Richard T. Ainsworth is an adjunct professor 
at the Boston University graduate tax program 
and the New York University graduate tax 
program. Xiuyuan (Tony) Hu is a tax LLM 
student at New York University.
In this article, the authors present the case for 
a globally effective remedial tax on 
cryptocurrency transactions that could help 
fund multinational relief efforts, such as 
providing aid to jurisdictions affected by the 
COVID-19 virus and countries fighting the 
opioid crisis.
1
See Ken Ritter, “Lawsuit: China Hid Virus Information, Should Pay 
Billions,” Associated Press, Mar. 24, 2020. See also Sadanand Dhume, 
“Delhi Isn’t Buying Beijing’s Coronavirus Hero Act,” The Wall Street 
Journal, Apr. 2, 2020.
2
See Hiroshi Kaneko, “Proposal for International Humanitarian Tax – 
A Consumption Tax on International Air Travel,” Tax Notes Int’l, Dec. 14, 
1998, p. 1911 (proposing, more than 20 years ago, a humanitarian tax on 
international air travel with the funds used to provide relief for disaster 
victims).
3
See testimony of Kirsten D. Madison, assistant secretary, Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Senate 
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, “Stopping the Poison Pills: 
Combating the Trafficking of Illegal Fentanyl From China” (Oct. 2, 2018).
4
See Peter D. Hardy, Alicia M. Went, and Shauna Pierson, “IRS CI 
Highlights International Efforts to Tackle Cryptocurrency Abuse, Money 
Laundering and Tax Evasion,” Ballard Spahr LLP Money Laundering 
Watch blog, Dec. 9, 2019.
5
See Caitlin Reilly, “Cryptocurrencies Complicate Effort to Stop 
Opioid Dealers,” Roll Call, Oct. 29, 2019.
6
See Chainalysis Team, “Chainalysis in Action: Analyzing a Fentanyl 
Dealer’s Cryptocurrency Transactions,” Chainalysis blog, Oct. 1, 2019.
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illicit profits untaxed, and their victims unaided 
and alone.7
From a revenue perspective, law 
enforcement’s obsession with unveiling criminals’ 
identity is somewhat misguided. Anonymity (or 
relative anonymity) is a magnet that draws 
criminals into the cryptocurrency world, which is 
a world that actually allows authorities to gauge 
the value of the illicit goods being exchanged as 
long as the transactions are recorded on the 
cryptocurrency’s public ledger. Imposing a flat-
rate sales tax on dark web transactions based on 
the value exchanged becomes easy, and it is 
particularly desirable if the funds are used to 
purchase medical supplies during a pandemic 
like COVID-19 or provide humanitarian 
assistance in its aftermath. These funds can be 
used more generally for a range of apt, public-
spirited ends such as reducing opioid overdoses, 
helping survivors of human trafficking, curtailing 
global dissemination of child pornography, and 
responding to terrorist attacks.
In this remedial model, cryptocurrency’s 
perceived financial anonymity functions as a bait 
that lures criminals to feed. The tax authorities 
may not know exactly who the criminals are or 
even what illicit goods they exchanged, but 
nonetheless the authorities can still collect a tax on 
their sales proceeds and put the revenue to good 
use. Without anonymity, criminals would be 
scared away and would leave the tax authorities 
little to work with.
‘Catch Me if You Can’
Probably as part of a publicity campaign to 
simultaneously boost the public’s confidence in 
the government and discourage criminals from 
using cryptocurrencies, law enforcement has been 
touting the fact that some of the most widely used 
cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, are only 
pseudo-anonymous. This means they can be 
traced using forensic analysis.
Forensic analysis starts with a bitcoin 
address’s transaction history.8 From there, law 
enforcement focuses on points of vulnerability — 
that is, times when the investigator might 
discover the criminal’s identity, such as when the 
cryptocurrency is exchanged for fiat currency.9 
Because U.S.-registered cryptocurrency 
exchanges must comply with know-your-
customer and anti-money-laundering (AML) 
regulations, authorities can subpoena the 
exchange to obtain information about specific 
users under investigation.10
Many non-U.S.-registered exchanges, 
however, do not necessarily comply with U.S. 
AML regulations because their home jurisdictions 
may have different — and often more lax — 
rules.11 Without effective coordination between 
jurisdictions, cross-jurisdictional investigations 
are likely to end in deadlock.
In 2019 three researchers based in Australia — 
Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen, and Tālis J. 
Putniņš — estimated that there are at least $76 
billion worth of illegal activities per year 
involving bitcoin, which translates to about 46 
percent of all bitcoin transactions.12 Their study 
took a sample composed of previously identified 
bitcoin users associated with dark web activities 
and used information regarding these known bad 
actors to estimate the total amount of illicit 
activity involving bitcoin.
Despite its popularity, bitcoin is not the only 
cryptocurrency gaining traction in the dark web 
world. In a 2018 study requested by the European 
Parliament, two Belgium-based researchers, 
Robby Houben and Alexander Snyers, made 
policy recommendations to the EU based on their 
study of 10 altcoins that had the highest market 
capitalization at the time.13 They suggested that 
the EU to create more weak spots by subjecting 
more players in the cryptocurrency market, such 
7
See Robby Houben and Alexander Snyers, “Cryptocurrencies and 
Blockchain: Legal Context and Implication for Financial Crime, Money 
Laundering and Tax Evasion,” European Parliament TAX3 Committee 
(July 2018).
8
See Chainalysis Team, supra note 6.
9
See Matthew Cronin, “Hunting in the Dark: A Prosecutor’s Guide to 
the Dark Net and Cryptocurrencies,” 66(4) Atty’s Bull. 65 (July 2018).
10
For example, in United States v. Coinbase Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
01431 (N.D. Cal. 2017), a court granted the IRS’s request for information 
about some of Coinbase’s customers because the IRS had reason to 
suspect some users did not report gains. Coinbase was responsible for 
keeping the data because of AML regulations.
11
See Craig Adeyanju, “What Crypto Exchanges Do to Comply With 
KYC, AML and CFT Regulations,” Cointelegraph, May 17, 2019.
12
See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, “Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How 
Much Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?” 32(5) Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 1798 (May 2019).
13
See Houben and Snyers, supra note 7.
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as miners, virtual currency exchange services, and 
custodian wallet providers, to the EU’s due 
diligence and registration requirements.
While blockchain technology has largely 
eliminated the role of financial institutions in 
transactions, Houben and Snyers propose 
inserting regulated intermediaries at various 
points in cryptocurrency transactions so that 
AML regulations attach to identifiable persons. 
This will give law enforcement more 
opportunities to pierce through the anonymity 
that is a feature of so many cryptocurrencies.
Notably, Houben and Snyers’ plan is 
philosophically incompatible with the vision of 
Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonymous author of 
the white paper “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic 
Cash System,” which was released simultaneously 
with the bitcoin application, and sought to create 
“a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash 
[that] would allow online payments to be sent 
directly from one party to another without going 
through a financial institution.”14 If implemented, 
Houben and Snyers’ proposal would effectively 
nullify the most innovative aspects of the 
blockchain technology.
In practice, however, the regulatory reforms 
that they propose may not be enough to complete 
the transformation of cryptocurrencies into fiat 
currencies that rely on financial institutions acting 
as trusted third parties. As the pair acknowledge, 
the use of forensic analysis to uncover a user’s 
identity cannot be made into:
a standardized approach to tackle money 
laundering, terrorist financing and tax 
evasion more widely: discovering 
identities in this way is too complex and 
costly to become the general answer to 
tackling this issue — and moreover, it will 
not certainly lead to any result.15
While Houben and Snyers’ policy 
recommendations would certainly give law 
enforcement more tools to work with, their study 
— taken together with the work of the three 
Australian researchers — ultimately suggests that 
without credible leads from informants or 
undercover agents to narrow down the targets, 
law enforcement is unlikely to have the 
bandwidth to conduct comprehensive 
investigations on the millions of cryptocurrency 
addresses that might be linked to illicit activities. 
After all, Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš estimate 
that, as of August 2017, at least 27 million bitcoin 
market participants were using the 
cryptocurrency primarily for illegal purposes to 
conduct some 37 million transactions each year.16
The optimism surrounding the use of forensic 
analysis to fight cryptocurrency-enabled crime is 
disproportionate to its practical utility. The vast 
majority of criminals using cryptocurrencies are 
daring, in some cases even taunting, law 
enforcement: “Catch me if you can.”
The Remedial Tax Proposal
The Question of Value
Not only does the remedial model work better 
with blockchain technology’s decentralizing 
feature, it is also more administrable in practice 
than relying on forensic analysis. Although the 
remedial tax alone does not provide justice to the 
victims of crypto crimes, it does ensure funds are 
readily available to make a real and positive 
impact on their lives. The key to taxing illicit 
goods is finding a reliable and accurate indicator 
of the value of goods transacted.
Transaction size might be a starting point for 
value. Taking bitcoin as an example, a byte is the 
measuring unit of the size of a bitcoin transaction. 
Transaction size, however, is not directly 
reflective of the amount of funds transferred.
We can calculate the size of a bitcoin 
transaction as follows:17 If our transaction has in 
inputs and out outputs, the transaction size (in 
bytes) will be:
in x 180 + out x 34 + 10 plus or minus in
If our transaction has one input and two 
outputs, then the transaction size should be 258 
bytes as follows:
1 x 180 + 2 x 34 + 10 + - 1
14
Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” (Oct. 
31, 2008).
15
Houben and Snyers, supra note 7.
16
See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, supra note 12.
17
See Kai Sedgwick, “How to Calculate Bitcoin Transaction Fees 
When You’re in a Hurry,” Bitcoin.com, Nov. 27, 2017.

































 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
This preprint research paper has not been pe r reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3700300
VIEWPOINT
924  TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, MAY 25, 2020
Here, “input” is related to the source or origin 
of the bitcoins used in the transaction, while 
“output” denotes the number of recipients. 
Notably, there is a transaction fee associated with 
each bitcoin transaction. The fee is not related to 
the amount transferred; instead, it is based on 
how the sender received the funds in the first 
place and the number of recipients.
The chief technology officer and one of the 
founders of Ripple, a U.S.-based technology 
company that primarily serves as a currency 
exchange and remittance network, David 
Schwartz, explains:
Imagine if you walk into a candy store and 
are told that a candy bar is 35 cents, but 
then when they rang you up, they tacked 
on a 15 cent fee. When you asked them 
what it was for, they explained that the 
previous customer had paid them all in 
pennies, and in order to give you your 
change, they’d have to count all those 
pennies, and that takes more time.18
So if the buyer obtained the bitcoins used in 
the transaction from several different sources, the 
input number would be larger and, based on the 
formula above, there would be a higher 
transaction fee. In short, bitcoin bases its 
transaction fee on how the funds are structured; it 
has nothing to do with the value of the transaction 
itself and thus is not a useful indicator of such.
A better indicator of the value of goods 
exchanged is the difference between the sender’s 
starting balance and the funds in the sender’s 
change address after the transaction. In a bitcoin 
transaction, if A has a balance of BTC 3 and wants 
to pay BTC 0.5 to B, A cannot simply send BTC 0.5 
and keep the remaining BTC 2.5 in her wallet.19 
Instead, A must spend the whole BTC 3 and 
designate BTC 0.5 to B while sending the 
remaining BTC 2.5 back to a change address that 
A controls.
Originally, bitcoin wallets asked users to 
designate a change address if they were not 
spending their whole balance. Now, so-called 
deterministic wallets automatically generate 
change addresses. To preserve bitcoin users’ 
privacy, these automatically generated change 
addresses are different from the users’ initial 
addresses (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
In Figure 1, transactions 1-5 involve an 
anonymous user who starts with a net balance of 
BTC 11.852428 and repeatedly sends BTC 0.8 to 
another bitcoin address. For each transaction, 
after the deduction of 0.8 BTC plus transaction 
fees, the remaining balance is returned to a 
change address that the sender controls.
Although it is unclear what the BTC 0.8 in this 
example is spent for, if it is used to purchase illicit 
goods then the dollar value corresponding to BTC 
0.8 at the time of the transaction is the best 
indication of the actual purchase price. A flat rate 
remedial tax should be attached to the BTC 0.8 
purchase price. This is akin to consumers paying 
a sales tax in the United States. In the remedial 
model proposed herein, the BTC 0.8 purchase 
price would be subject to a flat rate tax.
Thus, instead of using transaction size as a 
yardstick, the difference between a bitcoin user’s 
starting and remaining balance — even if these 
amounts are technically in two different accounts 
—  is a more reliable and accurate benchmark of 
the illicit goods’ actual value.
Example: Bitcoin’s Blockchain
Although the transacting parties’ identities 
are private on bitcoin’s blockchain, the details of 
their transactions are not. In Figures 2 and 3 (a 
randomly chosen record of a bitcoin transaction 
on its blockchain), an anonymous user with a 
starting balance of $1,590.10 spends $272.54 and 
ends up with $1,308.81 in her change address.
Again, the records do not show what this user 
received for the $272.54. However, if the money is 
used for illicit purposes, the remedial tax should 
apply to this dollar amount because it is best 
reflection of the actual purchase price of the goods 
or services that the user obtained.
A Supranational Body to Administer the Tax
As illustrated above, bitcoin’s blockchain does 
not disclose transacting parties’ IP addresses. 
Therefore, if the tax was administered at a 
18
This quote is from Schwartz’s answer to a StackExchange 
discussion thread started by the user macintosh264 titled “How to 
Calculate Transaction Size Before Sending (Legacy Non-Segwit — 
P2PKH/P2SH).” Both the question and answer were first posted on Sept. 
22, 2011.
19
See Harsh Agrawal, “What Are Unspent Transaction Outputs 
(UTXOs)?” Coinsutra (last updated Sept. 6, 2019).
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national level, jurisdictions would be likely to 
make competing claims to the collected proceeds. 
At a minimum, resolving potential jurisdictional 
conflicts would require knowledge of the 
transacting parties’ tax residences. Intrusive 
disclosures like this would ruin the privacy 
appeal of cryptocurrency. It is, however, worth 
noting that not all users of cryptocurrency are 
motivated by anonymity; there are subsets who 
primarily seek currency stability and others who 
like the digital mobility of cryptocurrency.
To avoid the extra headache, it would be 
preferable to have a supranational body like the 
United Nations administer the remedial tax and 
distribute the funds according to a particular 
jurisdiction’s needs. For example, when a 
jurisdiction is battling an opioid pandemic — a 
plight often associated with cryptocurrency — it 
could apply to the administering body for 
appropriate funds proportionate to the scale and 
severity of the crisis, and use the funds to reduce 
instances of overdosing and develop more 
advanced technology to detect opioids at port of 
entry. Similarly, the funds can provide relief for 
the economic impact of COVID-19 and other 
health epidemics. It would not be necessary for a 
health emergency to be directly associated with 
cryptocurrency transactions on the dark web for a 
jurisdiction to be eligible to receive remedial 
funds, but the health crisis would need to be 
multinational and not simply local.
Successful implementation of the remedial tax 
would require strong international cooperation 
and political will.
Considering Legal Uses of Cryptocurrency
Exceptions would not be needed if 
cryptocurrencies were used solely for illicit 
purposes. However, approximately half of all 
bitcoin transactions are not (at least on their face) 
associated with dark web activities or known bad 
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actors.20 Obviously, given the nature of the 
inquiry, data regarding the prevalence of illicit use 
of all crypto coins are limited. Still, it seems 
reasonable to say that not all cryptocurrency 
transactions involve illegal purposes. Thus, a 
sweeping remedial tax encompassing all 
cryptocurrency transactions seems excessive.
There are two main categories of legitimate 
uses of cryptocurrencies. The first group includes 
those who use cryptocurrencies to escape the 
repercussions of particular actions amid 
authoritarian regimes and minorities who want 
financial secrecy to avoid prejudice or peer 
pressure. For example, some individuals living 
under a repressive regime may want to purchase 
virtual private networks to gain uncensored 
access to the internet; in doing so, they must avoid 
leaving a trail of financial information that could 
lead to their arrest or even imprisonment.
For these individuals — those who use 
cryptocurrencies to preserve financial privacy — 
20
See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, supra note 12. But see Chainalysis, 
“The 2020 State of Crypto Crime” (Jan. 2020). Chainalysis released a 
report in January estimating that only about 1.1 percent of 
cryptocurrency transactions are for illicit purposes. However, in our 
opinion, the report does not adequately explain why its limited sample 
of a few known bad actors is representative of or proportional to the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem at large.
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the remedial tax can be viewed as a premium. 
From an enforcement point of view, it would be 
difficult to distinguish illicit uses of 
cryptocurrency’s privacy features from legitimate 
ones without destroying the desired anonymity. 
Because anonymity is a function that fiat currency 
does not provide, paying a premium for financial 
privacy makes sense from a consumer’s point of 
view.
A second group of legal uses of 
cryptocurrencies includes many large-volume 
transactions undertaken for speculative 
purposes.21 Opportunistic investors often hold 
cryptocurrencies as investment assets. For these 
individuals and investment companies, financial 
privacy is not a key factor. Rather, they hope to 
generate sizeable returns, and the fact that they 
are investing in cryptocurrency is usually not a 
secret.
It seems unfair to apply the remedial tax to 
these investors. This problem, however, could be 
remedied by offering refunds or tax credits to 
investors who are not looking for financial 
privacy. They could either seek refunds directly 
from the administering body or claim tax credits 
from their local tax authorities. For investors, the 
tradeoff is that they must disclose financial 
information to gain tax benefits. Unfortunately, 
refunds are hard to oversee and prone to fraud.
Alternatively, an exemption can apply to all 
transactions for which the taxpayer can show a 
local sales tax or VAT has been imposed and paid. 
All transactions would be assessed the remedial 
tax, but the transactions would not be specifically 
identified. If an individual did not want to claim 
an exemption for local taxes, then, by default, the 
user would pay the remedial tax on all 
transactions whether legal or illicit. The 
individual’s identity and activity would remain 
relatively private but, by paying the remedial tax, 
the user would contribute significantly to global 
relief activities. Compliant cryptocurrencies could 
imbed the remedial tax directly into their 
protocols as a condition of using the product, and 
the systems would automatically add the tax to 
each transaction. The administering body would 
be responsible for certifying that the modification 
worked, but the cryptocurrency companies would 
withhold tax on its behalf. In effect, the remedial 
tax would be a cost of conducting business using 
cryptocurrencies.
This proposal necessarily requires 
jurisdictions to cede taxing authority over 
cryptocurrencies to a supranational authority. The 
concession would be conditional. If the national 
tax authority were able to impose a tax on 
cryptocurrency transactions conducted by its 
resident nationals, the remedial tax would be 
extinguished and the funds returned to the 
cryptocurrency provider and, eventually, the 
users. In this respect, the remedial tax would 
facilitate domestic compliance in one of the most 
difficult enforcement areas.
Monero: A Game Changer?
A Cryptocurrency Designed for Privacy
Although the chance that a crypto criminal 
will actually be caught is slim, the mere possibility 
is enough to cause some sleepless nights. Because 
there is a market for crypto coin that is even more 
private, those with the technical know-how (and a 
desire to make money) invented Monero.
Developed in 2014, Monero uses three 
techniques to promote financial secrecy. The first 
involves stealth addresses — Monero generates 
new addresses for every transaction.22 Address 
reusage is a major privacy flaw in bitcoin because 
it enables law enforcement or another party to 
track the various incoming and outgoing 
transactions from a single address.23 To solve this 
problem, Monero obscures destination addresses 
in its blockchain.
Monero’s second privacy technique, ring 
signature, mixes the identity of the actual signer 
of a transaction with that of other possible 
signers.24 These possible signers — essentially, 
decoys — are selected from past transaction 
outputs on Monero’s blockchain to form a 
distinctive ring signature that makes it 
21
See Foley, Karlsen, and Putniņš, supra note 12.
22
See The Monero Project, “Stealth Addresses: The Basics,” 
Moneropedia (last accessed Mar. 31, 2020).
23
See Chainalysis Team, supra note 6 (address reusage made it 
possible for Chainalysis to conduct a forensic analysis of a drug dealer’s 
bitcoin transactions).
24
See The Monero Project, “The Basics of Ring Signature,” 
Moneropedia (last accessed Mar. 31, 2020).
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exponentially more difficult, if not impossible, for 
an observer to trace the transaction back to the 
actual signer.25
The third technique — ring confidential 
transactions or RingCT — hides the amount 
transferred in a Monero transaction so that it does 
not appear on its blockchain.26 Monero achieves 
this by using a Pedersen commitment, a tool that 
uses randomly generated variables to obscure the 
actual amount of funds transferred.27 This scheme 
allows the user to keep a piece of data — such as 
the actual amount transferred — secret, but 
commit to it so that the user cannot later change 
his mind. In other words, even if the commitment 
value is public, no one knows the actual amount 
transferred. Meanwhile, the commitment scheme 
keeps the transacting parties honest, allowing the 
Monero protocol to ensure the integrity of its 
blockchain’s bookkeeping.
Monero’s first two privacy features can coexist 
with the remedial tax because they merely add 
more layers of protection to ensure its users’ 
financial privacy. However, Monero’s third 
privacy feature cannot — it is specifically 
designed to obfuscate the amount of funds 
transferred, making it impossible to gauge the 
value of goods exchanged. Figure 4 illustrates 
what a Monero transaction looks like on its 
blockchain.
The transaction amount is concealed because 
of Monero’s RingCT technology. Unless there is 
another means by which to gauge the transaction 
amounts, Monero presents an existential threat to 
the feasibility of the remedial tax.
Reconciling the Remedial Tax With Monero
Because of Monero’s special features, 
cryptocurrency users would be drawn to Monero 
to gain privacy and avoid the remedial tax, 
thereby significantly shrinking the revenue pool. 
To reconcile Monero with the remedial tax, the 
administering body would need to negotiate with 
Monero’s core development team and ask them to 
change the protocol and reveal transaction 
amounts. If these negotiations stalemate, the 
25
See id. See also Bisade Asolo, “Monero Ring Signature Explained,” 
Mycryptopedia, Nov. 1, 2018.
26
See Asolo, “Monero Ring Confidential Transactions (RingCT),” 
Mycryptopedia, Nov. 1, 2018.
27
See Shen Noether, Adam Mackenzie, and Monero Core Team, 
“Ring Confidential Transactions,” Monero Research Lab (Feb. 2016).
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administering body may consider banning 
financial institutions from dealing with Monero 
altogether. Because cryptocurrencies are merely 
computer codes with no intrinsic value except for 
the value that is widely accepted by others, 
Monero would become worthless if it cannot be 
exchanged for fiat currency.
Ideally, a compromise would be reached that 
would allow Monero to continue its use of stealth 
addresses and ring signatures. It would, however, 
need to make a concession and reveal transaction 
amounts or at least propose an alternative plan 
that would allow the transactions to be subject to 
the remedial tax.
Conclusion
The remedial tax is a compromise. It 
recognizes and respects an individual’s legitimate 
financial privacy interest, but it also recognizes 
that financial anonymity will inevitably attract 
criminals. Legal and illegal uses of 
cryptocurrency are (and would remain) 
indistinguishable. While not perfect, the remedial 
tax offers a workable solution. It would assess a 
global tax on all cryptocurrency transactions with 
the proceeds kept in reserve for global 
emergencies, and it would accomplish this in a 
manner that respects legitimate local taxing 
interests. Ultimately, the remedial tax would only 
be imposed on transactions that, for whatever 
reason, a resident jurisdiction is unable to tax. 
Jurisdictions would conditionally cede the 
authority to impose the proposed remedial tax 
proposed to the U.N. or another supranational 
agency to achieve a level of justice not reachable 
today. 




Check out our state nexus tool featuring an 
interactive map and state-by-state comparison 
table, included with all Tax Notes State and 
Tax Notes Today State subscriptions.
taxnotes.com/nexus-tracker

































 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
This preprint research paper has not been pe r reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3700300
